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THE CIVIL WAR IN U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: A DRESS 
REHEARSAL FOR MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS 
THOMAS H. LEE* 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of the Civil War in the constitutional history of the United 
States is universally acknowledged.  Disagreement principally concerns 
characterization.  Does the post-bellum Constitution—including the Civil War 
Amendments—represent a fundamental transformation of the preexisting 
constitutional regime?1  Or is it more accurate to characterize the post-bellum 
Constitution as, for the most part, the liquidation of the meaning of the 
original, founding Constitution?2  On the second view, fundamental 
transformation is limited to abolishing the slavery institution and its incidents.  
This includes from an individual rights perspective the constitutional 
guarantees of equality, due process, and the franchise; and on a structural level 
recalibration of the national-state power balance. 
Regardless of one’s position in this debate, it seems fair to say that all 
discussion so far has been confined to the question of change and continuity in 
the domestic Constitution.  By “domestic” I mean the Constitution as it applies 
to the regulation of: (1) relations among the three branches of the national 
government in their governance of the country (separation of powers); (2) 
relations between national and state governments (federalism); and (3) the 
relations between the government (both national and state) and American 
citizens (individual rights).  The domestic focus seems justified: it was, after 
all, a “civil” war. 
But the American Civil War also had a significant international dimension.  
The Confederate States of America claimed from the start that secession made 
 
* Professor of Law and Director of International Studies, Fordham University School of Law.  
Portions of this Article draw on my chapter with Michael D. Ramsey entitled The Prize Cases: 
Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES (Christopher 
H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2008). 
 1. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99–100 (1998). 
 2. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 360, 
364–65 (1981). 
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them an independent sovereign nation.3  And to validate and maintain this 
status, the Confederate States desperately sought official recognition by 
foreign countries, international trade, and military aid and alliances, especially 
with Great Britain and France.4  Conversely, it was a high priority for the 
United States of America to prevent the Confederacy from achieving these 
objectives.  Accordingly, from the start of the war, Abraham Lincoln ordered a 
naval blockade to interdict all maritime trade to southern ports despite 
preexisting treaties of amity and commerce with, and the specter of military 
action against, neutral foreign countries;5 and the State Department lobbied the 
European powers to deny recognition of the Confederate States.6 
These positions were notable departures from the general trend of U.S. 
foreign policy since the founding.  The United States had traditionally 
championed neutrality and the free-trade rights of neutrals (even with 
belligerents), refrained from threatening military action against the European 
great powers, and encouraged the speedy recognition of organized rebellions in 
the Western Hemisphere (typically Latin American ex-colonies).7  Whether 
these settled patterns inhabited the hinterland or the heartland of what was 
permissible under the Constitution, it seems at least possible that the same 
debate about the Civil War’s transformative effect vel non on the domestic 
Constitution might be had about the foreign affairs Constitution—the 
Constitution as it regulates interactions between the United States and its 
citizens on the one hand, and foreign states and citizens on the other. 
Why, then, has the Civil War’s significance in the interpretation and 
evolution of the foreign affairs Constitution been altogether ignored?  There 
are plausible reasons for the oversight.  First, the foreign policy issues 
implicated in the war were important but secondary to the domestic nature of 
the conflict and its politics.  Second, and relatedly, the Civil War’s impact on 
the constitutional framework for foreign policy governance was not as 
dramatic as its effect on domestic governance; there are no Civil War 
Amendments in the foreign relations sphere.  Third, unlike the domestic 
Constitution, insights and developments in the foreign affairs Constitution 
generated by the Civil War (whether we call them transformations or 
liquidations) were not continuously in the spotlight in the decades immediately 
after the war.  Rather, they were largely forgotten as the Union dismantled its 
 
 3. See D.P. CROOK, THE NORTH, THE SOUTH, AND THE POWERS 1861–1865 (1974); DEAN 
B. MAHIN, ONE WAR AT A TIME: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL 
WAR 19 (1999). 
 4. See MAHIN, supra note 3, at 17, 20. 
 5. Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. app. 1258 (Apr. 19, 1861). 
 6. See MAHIN, supra note 3, at 12. 
 7. See LESTER D. LANGLEY, AMERICA AND THE AMERICAS: THE UNITED STATES IN THE 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 32, 34 (1989). 
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armies and fleets, turned inward to heal and westward to expand, and reverted 
to the country’s comfortable habit of pacific isolationism in relation to Western 
Europe.8  But the interpretations and the issues that inspired them would 
reappear later in the modern history of the United States as it reengaged the 
great powers and ultimately assumed a leading role in world politics. 
What were these important Civil War interpretations of the foreign affairs 
Constitution?  This Article will explore four examples, all of which appear in 
the Prize Cases9 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in March 1863 at the 
midpoint of the Civil War. 
But first let me explain why it is proper to focus on what seems to be an 
obscure and narrow judicial decision about U.S. naval operations to illuminate 
the general question of the Civil War’s impact on the U.S. constitutional law of 
foreign relations.  For the most part, even those legal scholars such as James 
Randall, who have addressed the constitutional questions raised by the 
American Civil War, have focused on the war on land, most notably on such 
famous and oft-discussed matters as the Lieber Code and the Emancipation 
Proclamation.10  But as historians like Stuart Bernath have implicitly 
acknowledged, it was with respect to the United States’ military actions at sea 
that we see most clearly how American statesmen, jurists, soldiers, and sailors 
of the time thought that the Constitution constrained or empowered their 
dealings with foreign nations. 11  And, of course, by contrast to the landlocked 
questions, we have in the Prize Cases a real-time decision of the Supreme 
Court to shed insight into their views. 
The first of the four U.S. foreign relations law insights of the Prize Cases 
that this Article will discuss is the notion that international law provides a basis 
for the President’s exercise of military force in a manner neither specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution nor preauthorized by congressional enactments.  
The specific military action was the proclamation of a naval blockade that 
applied not only to active Confederate belligerents but also to loyal U.S. 
citizens residing in seceding or soon-to-secede states and to foreign neutral 
citizens.12  The second insight is the notion that federal constitutional law 
protections for U.S. citizens, such as the Fifth Amendment prohibition on the 
taking of private property, may be displaced by the international laws of war 
even in a category of conflict—civil war—not seemingly governed by 
international law and with respect to noncombatant U.S. citizens who claimed 
 
 8. See MAHIN, supra note 3, at 12. 
 9. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
 10. See J.G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed., Peter Smith 
1963) (1926). 
 11. See STUART L. BERNATH, SQUALL ACROSS THE ATLANTIC: AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
PRIZE CASES AND DIPLOMACY (1970). 
 12. Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. app. 1258 (Apr. 19, 1861). 
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to be loyal.  The third is the idea that the President may, consistent with the 
Constitution, unilaterally disregard or suspend the operation of on-point 
provisions in peacetime treaties in times of war, such as suspending—by the 
proclamation of blockade—terms in treaties of amity and commerce 
committing the United States to allow the merchant ships of its treaty partners 
free entry to its ports.  The fourth is the role of judicial deference to the 
Executive in its interpretations of international law, both treaties and the 
customary international laws of war, particularly with respect to executive 
interpretations that appear to “push the envelope” in terms of what might be 
viewed as permissible under the prevailing rules of the laws of war.  This 
Article will address each in turn after a short description of the facts and legal 
issues in the Prize Cases. 
I.  THE PRIZE CASES 
On April 19, 1861, exactly one week after Confederate troops opened fire 
on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, Abraham Lincoln 
proclaimed a blockade of ports in the seven southern states that had already 
seceded.13  The operative language in the proclamation sounds evasive.  
Lincoln stated that he “deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the 
ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States 
and of the law of nations in such case provided.”14  Lincoln’s proclamation 
also explicitly referenced an April 17, 1861 proclamation issued by the 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis inviting “all those who may desire” to 
apply for letters of marque and reprisal to attack Union shipping.15  Lincoln’s 
reference to Davis’s prior “threat[] to grant pretended letters of marque . . . to  
commit assaults on . . . good citizens of the country lawfully engaged in 
commerce on the high seas”16 was important from a laws-of-war perspective, 
as it might be used to justify his own proclamations of  blockade as a 
reciprocal reprisal.  On April 27, 1861, using identical language, Lincoln 
extended the blockade to the ports of Virginia and North Carolina in light of 
the imminent secession of those states.17 
 
 13. Id.  The seven states were South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas.  Id. 
 14. Id. at 1259. 
 15. Id. at 1258–59 (referencing Jefferson Davis, By the President of the Confederate States: 
A Proclamation (Apr. 17, 1861), reprinted in 1 THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF JEFFERSON 
DAVIS AND THE CONFEDERACY INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, 1861–1865, at 60, 
61 (James D. Richardson ed., Chelsea House-Robert Hector Publishers 1966) (1905)). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Proclamation No. 5, 12 Stat. app. 1259 (Apr. 27, 1861). 
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Congress was recessed at the time of Lincoln’s blockade proclamations.18  
When it reconvened without delegations from the seceded states in a special 
month-long summer session starting July 4, 1861, it was dominated by 
Northerners.19  Within a week, this Congress passed resolutions granting the 
President the prospective power to declare parts of the country in 
“insurrection” and to proscribe commerce to and from such parts.20  Congress 
also debated a proposal to ratify all of Lincoln’s unilateral wartime measures: 
an April 15 request for 75,000 militiamen from state governors;21 a May 3 call 
for 42,000 federal volunteers;22 the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 
Maryland in reaction to pro-secession riots in Baltimore in April;23 and the 
April 19 and 27 blockade proclamations.24  It was Lincoln’s suspension of 
habeas corpus that excited the most heated exchanges in the national 
Legislature.  For reasons that remain obscure, Congress did not enact a specific 
statute ratifying Lincoln’s measures but rather approved them in a roundabout 
rider tacked onto a statute increasing pay for federal troops.25  The provision 
stated that “all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President . . . 
respecting the army and navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to 
the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved and in all 
respects legalized.”26 
Although Lincoln did not authorize significant military action on land until 
Congress convened, the Navy moved to enforce the blockade immediately.  
The Prize Cases concerned the U.S. Navy’s capture of four cargo-bearing 
merchant ships between May 17 and July 10, 1861, 27 prior to Congress’s July 
13 and August 6 statutes approving the President’s military actions.  Two of 
the ships, the Amy Warwick and the Crenshaw, were owned by United States 
citizens who lived in Virginia but swore loyalty to the Union—an allegiance 
 
 18. See RONALD C. WHITE, JR., THE ELOQUENT PRESIDENT: A PORTRAIT OF LINCOLN 
THROUGH HIS WORDS 104 (2005). 
 19. See id. at 112; 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, TREATIES, AND PROCLAMATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 255 (George P. Sanger ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1863) 
(explaining that the President called a session of Congress to begin on July 4, 1861). 
 20. Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 3, §§ 5–6, 12 Stat. 255, 257. 
 21. Proclamation No. 3, 12 Stat. app. 1258 (Apr. 15, 1861). 
 22. Proclamation No. 6, 12 Stat. app. 1260 (May 3, 1861). 
 23. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
25 (1998). 
 24. Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. app. 1258 (Apr. 19, 1861); Proclamation No. 5, 12 Stat. 
app. 1259 (Apr. 27, 1861). 
 25. Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326, 326 (“An Act to increase the Pay of the 
Privates in the Regular Army and in the Volunteers in the Service of the United States, and for 
other purposes.”). 
 26. Id. 
 27. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 636–39 (1863). 
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the Government did not question.28  The Crenshaw was captured leaving 
Richmond for Great Britain with a cargo of tobacco owned mostly by 
Virginians on May 17, 1861.29  The Amy Warwick was captured with a cargo 
of coffee owned by U.S. citizens in Virginia on July 10, 1861, en route to 
Virginia from Rio de Janeiro.30  The other two merchant ships were owned by 
private foreigners from neutral countries—the Hiawatha by a British subject 
and the Brilliante by a Mexican citizen.31  The Hiawatha was captured on May 
20, 1861, leaving Richmond for Great Britain with a cargo of tobacco owned 
by British and Virginian interests.32  The Brilliante was captured anchored in 
Biloxi Bay on June 23, 1861.33  The U.S. Government argued that the ship was 
preparing to breach the blockade outward to Mexico from New Orleans with a 
cargo of flour owned by Mexicans.34  Upon capture, all four ships were sailed 
into Union ports and “condemned” in actions before federal district judges 
acting as prize courts.35 
The ship and cargo owners made several arguments in the federal courts 
against the legality of the condemnations of their property.  First, the Virginian 
ship and cargo owners of the U.S.-flagged Amy Warwick and Crenshaw 
asserted that, as loyal citizens of the United States, the taking of their property 
was not governed by the international laws of war permitting capture of 
enemies’ property at sea, but rather by the Fifth Amendment.36  Second, the 
Crenshaw claimants—along with the British and Virginian Hiawatha 
claimants—argued inadequate notice, their respective captures on May 17 and 
May 20 off the coast of Virginia having come very shortly after Lincoln’s 
April 27 proclamation of blockade.37  Both of these arguments implicitly 
presumed the validity of the blockade under international and domestic law but 
sought to craft an equitable exception.  The third argument was made by the 
Mexican owners of the Brilliante and her cargo of flour—represented by 
Washington, D.C. lawyer James Carlisle.38  The Brilliante claimants directly 
contested the very validity of the blockade itself by asserting that the 
circumstances of the rebellion at the relevant time did not constitute a “state of 
war” under international law, that the President did not have the power to 
 
 28. See id. at 637–38, 651. 
 29. See id. at 637; ROBERT BRUCE MURRAY, LEGAL CASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 4 (2003). 
 30. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 637; MURRAY, supra note 29, at 6. 
 31. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 638. 
 32. See id.; MURRAY, supra note 29, at 5–6. 
 33. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 638–39; MURRAY, supra note 29, at 4. 
 34. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 638–40, 678–80. 
 35. See id. at 636–37; MADELINE RUSSELL ROBINTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERS 
OF THE NEW YORK PRIZE COURT, 1861–1865, at 49–50 (1945). 
 36. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671–74. 
 37. See id. at 637–38. 
 38. See id. at 639. 
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declare the blockade under U.S. constitutional law, and that the Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo committed the United States to allowing free trade 
between all Mexican and U.S. ports, including those in the seceded states.39  
Carlisle also argued that the Brilliante had no intent to run the blockade.40 
All the owners lost in the district courts and appealed.41  The Supreme 
Court consolidated the four cases for argument in February 1863.42  In a 5-4 
decision published the next month, the Court upheld the specific captures and, 
more importantly, the general legality of the blockade.43  Justice Robert Grier 
wrote the majority opinion in favor of the Government;44 Justice Samuel 
Nelson wrote a dissent for himself and three other justices including Chief 
Justice Roger Taney.45 
II.  INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE SOURCE OF THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO 
DECLARE A BLOCKADE 
A “blockade” is the use of armed force to prohibit seaborne passage to and 
from the ports and coasts belonging to the enemy.  The land-based analogue is 
a siege.  Under the contemporaneous laws of war, just as one country could not 
lay siege to the cities of another with its armies unless the two were at war with 
each other, the customs of the time held that one country’s navies could not 
blockade the ports of another unless they were in a “state of war.”46  Even then, 
just as it might be argued that humanitarian customs and morality required 
besieging armies to permit the passage of food and medical supplies, the laws 
of war at sea recognized that a blockade was technically limited to the 
interdiction of cargo of military value to the enemy, which was called 
“contraband.”47 
Any ship seeking to “run” the blockade by evading the naval forces 
enforcing it could be captured and condemned in a prize court along with its 
cargo so long as the ship’s owners or crew had notice of the existence of the 
blockade.48  Cargo owners were liable to have their cargo condemned if they 
had notice of the blockade and of the ship’s intent to run it.  In theory, a 
merchantman carrying non-contraband cargo of no military value could declare 
 
 39. See id. at 641–50; MURRAY, supra note 29, at 7–9. 
 40. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 639–40. 
 41. Id. at 637. 
 42. MURRAY, supra note 29, at 6–7. 
 43. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671, 674–82. 
 44. Id. at 665–82. 
 45. Id. at 682–99. 
 46. See id. at 665–66. 
 47. See John B. Hattendorf, Maritime Conflict, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON 
WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 98, 106 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994). 
 48. See 1 CARLTON SAVAGE, POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD MARITIME 
COMMERCE IN WAR 87–88 (1934). 
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its presence to the blockading squadron, submit to search, and be allowed to 
pass once the non-military nature of its mission was verified.  But the breadth 
with which the blockading force could define “contraband” under the 
international maritime law of the time,49 coupled with the doctrine of 
“contamination” (anything of military value onboard rendered the entire cargo 
condemnable),50 meant that this was not a promising tack.  And so in practical 
terms, the proclamation of a blockade entailed the complete stoppage of 
maritime trade to the blockaded enemy. 
The antebellum United States, as a perennial neutral heavily reliant on 
maritime trade, had been the most vocal among the Eurocentric community of 
nations in advocating rules of international law circumscribing as much as 
possible the belligerent rights to blockade and its incidents.51  The normative 
appeal of the ideology of free trade was particularly strong among the liberal 
democracies of the mid-nineteenth century.52  This gave the Americans an 
ideological high ground in pushing their self-interested position.  The “state of 
war” requirement meant that a country could not lawfully block international 
trade to another country absent war between the two countries, which was to 
be signified by a declaration of war by the country seeking to blockade.  It 
could, without declaring war, pass municipal embargo legislation, but that 
would act only to cut off trade to the other country by the nation’s own 
citizens.  The possibility that the necessary “state of war” under international 
law might be triggered by something other than a declaration of war by the 
governance institution authorized to declare war under a country’s municipal 
constitution was a key issue in the Prize Cases.53 
But as the current blockade rule illustrates54 and as might be inferred by 
reference to the municipal analogue of embargo, one could claim that the 
power to order the stoppage of trade with another country, even by deployment 
of naval forces, is not necessarily a “war” power.  It was international law that 
made it a war power, and no judge or litigant in the Prize Cases questioned the 
relevance of the international law rule, for instance, by asserting that the 
 
 49. Interestingly, the Navy Department never issued a list of contraband items during the 
War.  The Treasury Department prepared a list in May 1862 to guide its customs collectors.  Id. at 
91–92. 
 50. See The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28, 37–38 (1866) (citing The Maria, (1805) 165 
Eng. Rep. 901 (H. Ct. Adm.)). 
 51. See Hattendorf, supra note 47, at 107–09; SAVAGE, supra note 48, at 44–47. 
 52. See Hattendorf, supra note 47, at 109. 
 53. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666–71 (1863). 
 54. A “state of war” may not be a strict requirement of blockade at customary international 
law today, as demonstrated by the U.S. Navy’s “quarantine” of Cuba during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis—a military operation that, in practical terms, was indistinguishable from blockade.  
Contemporary treaty law also presumptively authorizes the United Nations Security Council to 
order a blockade even in the absence of war.  See U.N. Charter art. 42. 
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President could—or could not—proclaim the blockade regardless of whether 
or not the insurrection was itself a “war” in a qualifying sense under 
international law.  Thus one might say that for the Court, international law 
defined and enhanced the scope of presidential war power.  If so, that might 
suggest the case as precedent for the proposition that international law can 
restrict the scope of presidential war power as well.55 
There were two reasons why Lincoln’s decision to declare a blockade was 
viewed at the time as problematic.56  First, Lincoln’s act of deploying a 
concept (blockade) from the international laws of war as they applied among 
independent sovereign states could be used by foreign nations as support for 
recognizing the Confederacy as an independent nation.  It is worth recalling 
that a principal basis on which the French during the Revolutionary War 
justified recognition of the independent United States by “treating” with its 
commissioners in 1778 was that Great Britain had applied the laws of war to 
its conflict with its former colonies (albeit somewhat selectively) to include 
cartel agreements for the exchange of prisoners of war, armistices, and 
negotiated surrenders.57  Indeed, it seems fair to say that by 1861 the law of 
nations had evolved to this more positivist principle of state recognition which, 
at the very least, had been the United States’ customary position, such as 
regarding revolutionary republics in Latin America prior to the Civil War.58  If 
Great Britain and France were to recognize the Confederate States as an 
independent country, then they might be more inclined to give them military 
and economic assistance in their conflict with the Union. 
The main alternative principle of state recognition under international law, 
in the mid-nineteenth century championed unsurprisingly by monarchies 
seeking to rein in domestic secessionist movements (e.g., Austria-Hungary, 
Spain), would have required the parent country formally to renounce its 
sovereignty over a seceding state or states before recognizing the latter’s 
membership in the community of nations.  This was the British position in the 
American Revolutionary War, 59 although Great Britain had earlier indicated a 
 
 55. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 362–67 
(2007) (suggesting that, under the Constitution’s original understanding, international law limited 
presidential power through the Take Care Clause); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
61 (2007) (suggesting that modern courts take international law into account in defining 
presidential powers). 
 56. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 351 (2005). 
 57. See HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA; 
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, 1842, at 290–92 (New York, 
Gould, Banks & Co. 1845). 
 58. See SAVAGE, supra note 48, at 42–44. 
 59. See WHEATON, supra note 57, at 291–92. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
62 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:53 
contrary view in its prompt recognition of the validity of the Netherlands’ 
secession from Spain.  But it had never been the American position on the 
international law of recognition prior to the Civil War, and by the mid-
nineteenth century, although perhaps not retired altogether by desuetude, it was 
a distinct minority view among the great powers and perceived as reactionary 
and quaint. 
In view of the high recognition risk involved in declaring a blockade, 
Lincoln considered but ultimately dismissed two other options.  He might have 
opted not to have restricted international maritime trade to the Confederacy at 
all, contenting himself with a national embargo to cut off all interstate trade 
whether by land or water.  Given the laughable state of the United States Navy 
in April 1861 (it had seventy-six seagoing vessels),60 this might have struck 
some as the only realistic option.  But the nature of the Confederate economy 
rendered this an unattractive course from the perspective of military strategy.  
Even as the broad expanse of the seceded states rendered invasion by land 
forces a daunting prospect, the South was heavily agrarian with little 
indigenous industry.  It would need to export its agricultural products, most 
notably cotton and tobacco, and to import war material, manufactures, and 
industrial goods, in order to fight for and maintain its independence.  To be 
sure, the cutoff of access to northern goods and manufactures was no small 
blow to the Confederate economy, but it would not suffice to strangle the 
South’s livelihood, particularly in the event of a long and drawn-out war. 
A more attractive option was to declare a closure of the key ports in the 
southern states.  Port closures were effected by municipal action only, for 
instance in cases of quarantine because of infectious disease, and so they did 
not have the same international law recognition ramifications as a blockade.61  
But by the same token, a foreign ship and its cargo that entered a “closed” port 
could not be punished or condemned under international law.62  (An American 
ship could be punished if the closure was supplemented by an embargo.)  
Additionally, a closure was limited merely to the issue of access to the port, 
and so it could only be effective if it could be enforced by the local authorities 
both by land (the docks, piers, etc.) and on water.  But with the exception of 
New Orleans, the United States would not have the land forces to close any of 
the main southern ports until the very end of the war.63  And so, in practical 
terms, a closure of the southern ports was not a real option. 
The second reason why blockade was a particularly sensitive exercise of 
military force was because it was directed in large part at neutral nations and 
not just the enemy.  To be sure, the objective was to deny the enemy access to 
 
 60. See GOODWIN, supra note 56, at 672. 
 61. See BERNATH, supra note 11, at 19. 
 62. See MAHIN, supra note 3, at 53. 
 63. See id. at 172–73. 
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supplies and the benefits of trade, but the means of doing so entailed cutting 
off the prerogative of peaceful neutral nations to engage in free trade.  
Moreover, in some instances the prerogative was explicitly guaranteed by the 
terms of bilateral treaties of amity and commerce between the blockading 
nation and the neutral at issue.  A good example was the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo with Mexico, which had ended the Mexican-American War.64 
This aspect of blockade—infringing as it did upon the default rights of 
neutrals at classical international law—bore more than a passing resemblance 
to the issue of belligerent rights to transit neutral waters or territory under the 
doctrine of “innocent passage.”65  Just as in proclaiming a blockade a 
belligerent encroaches upon the treaty and law-of-nations rights of a neutral to 
trade, in demanding (as opposed to requesting) passage through a neutral’s 
waters or territory a belligerent trespasses upon the international legal rights of 
the neutral to command and control its sovereign territory.66  Indeed, it was this 
very issue of Germany’s belligerent transit through neutral Belgium that was 
the formal legal reason that brought Great Britain into the First World War on 
France’s side.  From the United States’ perspective in the Civil War, these 
same two powers were the neutrals whose default rights were being infringed 
upon by Lincoln’s proclamation of a blockade. 
Nor, despite Lincoln’s reference to the “pursuance of the laws of the 
United States” in his proclamations, 67 was a blockade of the sort he ordered 
authorized by any Congressional statute.  Yes, there were venerable statutes on 
the books (from 1795 and 1807) that authorized the President to respond with 
armed force against enemies, foreign or domestic, who might invade or incite 
insurrection. 68  And it could be argued that, under the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause of the Constitution, the President might be justified in taking defensive 
actions against foreign invaders and domestic insurrectionists, even without the 
enabling statutes. 
But because Lincoln’s blockade also deployed armed force against foreign 
neutrals and presumptively loyal Americans, it was clear that these statutes or a 
purely defensive constitutional war power would not suffice to authorize such 
a patently offensive use of armed force.  In other words if Lincoln had 
proclaimed a blockade of the southern ports that would only apply to vessels 
flying the Confederate flag, the United States flag, or the flags of any foreign 
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allies of the Confederates, then the preexisting statutes or constitutional power 
would have sufficed.  But the proclamation of blockade was acutely sensitive 
precisely because a principal target of the use of naval force was the private 
citizens of powerful neutral countries that the United States desired to prevent 
from becoming Confederate allies.69  And, from the perspectives of Great 
Britain and France, the proclamation of blockade could only appear to be an 
offensive act of military force, since they had neither invaded the United States 
nor actively encouraged the Confederate insurrection. 
In summary, by proclaiming the blockade in April 1861, Lincoln had 
committed a belligerent act that was unauthorized by the explicit words of the 
Constitution and unauthorized by congressional statutes.  Nor could the act be 
grounded in some defensive gloss on his power as Commander in Chief, in 
light of the patently offensive use of armed force on the private citizens of 
neutral foreign countries that had neither invaded the United States nor actively 
aided insurrection.  The proclamation carried with it not only the cost of 
offending those powerful neutral nations, but also the risk that they would 
characterize the invocation of the laws of war by the Union against the 
Confederacy as evidence in support of recognition of the Confederacy as a new 
independent member of the community of nations. 
To mitigate the possibility of recognition blowback, Lincoln and his 
advisers articulated the theory that it was possible for the United States to 
exercise belligerent rights against the Confederacy without surrendering any 
claims to sovereignty rights.70  This splitting of the bundle of international 
legal rights was something the founding Americans had ridiculed when the 
British had made the same point during the Revolutionary War.  The British, 
on the occasions where they had afforded Americans laws-of-war 
accommodations, cast their compliance with those laws as a matter of policy 
grace, not international legal compulsion.  Lincoln’s invocation in this instance 
was importantly different, however, because he sought by invoking belligerent 
rights to implement more severe, not kinder, measures against rebels. 
III.  THE “PREEMPTION” OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS OF THE U.S. 
CITIZEN CLAIMANTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR 
The Crenshaw and the Amy Warwick had been flying the United States 
flag when they were captured.71  Both ships were owned by U.S. citizens who 
resided in Virginia but who claimed loyalty to the Union, a claim that the 
Government’s lawyers did not challenge before the Supreme Court.72  The 
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Crenshaw’s cargo of tobacco was mostly owned by Virginians who claimed 
loyalty to the Union, as did the owners of the Amy Warwick’s cargo.73  The 
Hiawatha was a British-owned ship, but a part of its cargo was owned by 
Virginians who similarly alleged loyalty.74  The relevant cargo and ship 
owners asserted that takings of the property of loyal U.S. citizens should be 
regulated by domestic constitutional law, namely the Due Process and Takings 
Clause protections of the Fifth Amendment, and not by the “enemies’ 
property” doctrine under the international laws of war.75  This argument 
seemed particularly strong in the case of the U.S. citizen claimants in the 
Crenshaw and Hiawatha cases: these ships were captured leaving Virginia 
ports for Great Britain on May 17 and May 20, 1861,76 six and three days 
respectively before Virginia’s citizens approved secession from the Union by 
popular referendum on May 23, 1861.77 
The Government’s lawyer, Richard Dana, argued in response that it was 
universally accepted under the international laws of war that enemy property 
could be seized, even if the individual owners were not taking part in hostilities 
(or even opposing them).78  He asserted, without any direct support, that the 
same rule should apply in “internal wars.”79  The Government’s position 
masked a major problem: in an “internal” war, by contrast to a foreign war, 
loyal citizens of a national government who happened to reside in so-called 
“enemy” states seeking secession could plausibly claim the protections of not 
only international law but also the nation’s domestic constitution with respect 
to takings of their private property by governmental force.  In other words, the 
Government assumed—without bothering to justify the assumption—that in a 
war of domestic complexion implicating the rights of U.S. citizens, the 
international laws of war displaced (or allowed the President to displace) rules 
of domestic constitutional law that would have regulated the subject during 
peacetime, at least insofar as such rules applied to states in secession.  This 
was in essence Lincoln’s legal argument justifying the Emancipation 
Proclamation, announced only a few weeks prior to the oral arguments in the 
Prize Cases.80  Its premise also seems to contradict the U.S. government’s 
antebellum interpretation of the laws of war to incorporate the customary 
principle that no private property—enemy or neutral—should be subject to 
condemnation in war. 
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The Court concluded, however, that the U.S. claimants’ assertion “that the 
Constitution and Laws of the United States are still operative over persons in 
all the States” rested on two dubious propositions “without foundation on the 
established law of nations.”81  First, it was not true that just because a civil war 
exists, “the party belligerent claiming to be sovereign” can only exercise 
domestic sovereign rights and not any belligerent’s rights (including the right 
of capture of enemy property) over the other party.82  By contrast, the Court 
asserted that “it is a proposition never doubted, that the belligerent party who 
claims to be sovereign [the United States], may exercise both belligerent and 
sovereign rights.”83 
Second, it was also erroneous of the claimants to assert that “[w]hether 
property be liable to capture as ‘enemies’ property’” in a civil war depends “on 
the personal allegiance of the owner.”84  Grier adopted Dana’s underlying 
assumption of total war and articulated a distinctively positivist outlook.  There 
was “a boundary marked by lines of bayonets, and which can be crossed only 
by force—south of this line is enemies’ territory, because it is claimed and held 
in possession by an organized, hostile and belligerent power.”85  Any property 
belonging to any resident of that cordoned-off hostile territory, even an 
allegedly loyal U.S. citizen, was liable to be treated as enemies’ property—“a 
technical phrase peculiar to prize courts”—because it “may be used to increase 
the revenues of the hostile power.”86  In reaching these conclusions, Grier 
accepted uncritically Dana’s theory of enemies’ property without considering 
the ramifications of the wholesale displacement of domestic constitutional law 
protections for residents of the rebellious states (including potential union 
loyalists) by the international laws of war.   
IV.  CUSTOMARY LAWS-OF-WAR PREEMPTION OF TREATIES OF AMITY AND 
COMMERCE 
One of the arguments made by James Carlisle on behalf of the Brilliante 
claimants posited a tension between Lincoln’s proclamation of blockade and a 
preexisting treaty ratified by the United States.87  Carlisle implied that Article 
17 of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848 revived an 1831 Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce between United States and Mexico that opened the ports 
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of the two countries to mutual commerce.88  That treaty commitment, 
according to Carlisle, was not “suspended or abrogated by Act of Congress” or 
“in any degree disturbed by the National Legislature.”89  In other words, 
Carlisle suggested that a treaty ratified by the President with senatorial advice 
and consent supplied an on-point rule that the Mexican ship Brilliante could 
take its Mexican-owned flour from New Orleans to Mexico, and that rule could 
not be “suspended or abrogated” by a later-in-time presidential proclamation of 
blockade in the absence of explicit congressional authorization.90 
Interestingly, the Court did not address this particular argument, although 
in retrospect there were at least two plausible grounds to rebut Carlisle’s 
assertion.  First, one might argue that Lincoln’s proclamation of blockade 
amounted to a partial termination of the earlier Treaty.  As Professor Henkin 
has noted, “Presidents have claimed authority, presumably under their foreign 
affairs power, to act for the United States to terminate treaties . . . even in 
violation of international law.”91  But the examples Henkin lists—Franklin 
Roosevelt’s reactive denunciation of an extradition treaty with Greece in 1933 
because of Greece’s prior failure to honor it and his denunciation of the Treaty 
of Commerce, Friendship and Navigation with Japan in 193992—involved 
colorable claims of reciprocal termination because of prior malfeasance on the 
part of the treaty partner.  No such claim could be made with respect to Mexico 
under the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.  Moreover, in both cases the President 
specifically invoked the termination power, 93 something absent in Lincoln’s 
proclamations.  Henkin’s third example, Jimmy Carter’s termination of the 
Defense Treaty with the Republic of China in 1979, also seems inapposite, 
since that termination was made with notice under the express terms of the 
Treaty.94 
A second possibility is that Congress did in fact abrogate the Treaty’s 
open-ports provision in its post hoc ratification of Lincoln’s actions during the 
1861 special session.  It is commonly accepted today that a later-in-time statute 
may override a prior treaty, although the key precedents so stating postdate the 
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Civil War.95  If so, could it not be argued that Congress’s retroactive approval 
of Lincoln’s blockade imparted upon the presidential decision the same legal 
effect as a later-in-time statute?  The argument is certainly plausible, but it is 
interesting to note that the Court’s opinion in the Prize Cases does not make 
much of the retroactive statutes in general and indicates that the point was not 
necessary to its holding.96  It may be that the reason for this lack of reliance on 
what would be the anchor of any modern justification of a President’s wartime 
measures97 was the possibility of an ex post facto violation: to the extent that 
the statutes authorized the condemnation of the property of U.S. citizens 
pledging their loyalty as enemies’ property, it might be interpreted as a 
violation of Article I, Section 9’s provision that no “ex post facto Law shall be 
passed.”98  The majority recognized that retroactivity would “have some 
weight on the trial of an indictment in a criminal Court,” but suggested that 
such “precedents . . . cannot be received as authoritative” in a prize court 
proceeding.99 
V.  JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
What do the Prize Cases tell us about judicial deference to the President in 
foreign relations matters?  The most immediately striking aspect of the Prize 
Cases is that the Court considered a constitutional challenge to the President’s 
military actions during wartime and almost ruled against the President.  And 
this attention came despite strong arguments by the President’s counsel for 
judicial abstention (including, apparently, the suggestion that deciding the 
merits would make the Court an “ally of the enemy”).100  In the twentieth 
century, Justice William Douglas seized on this point to assert that the Prize 
Cases supplied support for a strong judicial role in monitoring presidential war 
powers.101 
But although the Court made a show of deciding the merits, ultimately the 
majority opinion contains language of substantial deference to the Executive.  
The Court was quite willing to accept the President’s characterization of the 
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situation as war102 (even though at the time the blockade was proclaimed, shots 
had been fired only at a single fort and no one had been killed by hostile fire).  
Indeed, the majority agreed with U.S. Attorney Dana that the President’s 
determination on this ground was conclusive on the Court, a point Justice 
Clarence Thomas has emphasized in his dissents.103 
On the other hand, notwithstanding the language of deference on the 
crucial question of whether the insurrection had progressed to the level of a 
full-blown civil war, the Court also referred to contemporaneous recognition of 
a state of war by foreign nations, the amorphous and evolving nature of a civil 
war, the disruption of the courts, and the commonsense obviousness of its 
conclusion before making the point about deference.104  Indeed, one could 
easily argue that the executive deference point (like the alternative rationale of 
legislative ratification) was a throwaway placed late in the opinion as a nail in 
the coffin.  Nor, for that matter, did the Court adopt the most pro-government 
position adopted by a lower court.  Judge Sprague, in the federal district court 
for Massachusetts, appeared to suggest that it was completely discretionary to 
the Government to claim belligerent and sovereign rights as to Confederates, 
and to toggle back and forth between one and the other according to what best 
served its military interests.105  “The temporary non-use[] of such [sovereign] 
rights [by treating rebel privateers as prisoners of war and not traitors and 
pirates] is not a renunciation of them, but they may be called into practical 
exercise at pleasure.”106 
On the more immediate level of how the international law of prize was to 
be applied to the cases at bar, however, the Court was exceedingly deferential 
to the President.  For instance, the owners of the Brilliante had argued that the 
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ship had been anchored in Biloxi Bay when captured, awaiting a safe conduct 
to clear American waters for Mexico.107  The pass should have been granted as 
a matter of course under the view of international maritime law that the United 
States had held before the Civil War, since it was a private neutral vessel 
carrying neutral-owned cargo to a neutral port.  And the Court, as a prize court 
of last resort, had the authority to examine the facts of the case de novo.  
Secondly and more importantly, the majority readily accepted Dana’s 
innovative theory of enemies’ property to settle the Amy Warwick and 
Crenshaw cases.  This acceptance came despite the absence of support on point 
for extending the concept to a civil war and the significant concerns voiced by 
the claimants’ counsel regarding the use of international law to displace 
domestic constitutional protections for presumptively loyal U.S. citizens.  The 
extent of executive deference as to prize law questions in these cases stands in 
stark contrast to the Court’s opinion in the famous decision in The Paquete 
Habana, a case arising out of the Spanish-American War three decades later, 
in which it paid no deference to the Executive’s litigating position that fishing 
vessels were lawful prizes under international law.108 
CONCLUSION 
In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as the United States assumed a 
more active role as a great—and then a super—power in world politics, 
versions of the Civil War interpretations of the foreign affairs Constitution 
discussed above became orthodoxy without apparent awareness of their roots.  
Conservative constitutionalists, like John Yoo, have sought to validate certain 
aspects of the modern transformations in U.S. foreign relations law—such as 
the unilateral power of the Executive in foreign affairs—by reference to 
Founding-era precedents.109  On the other hand, progressive constitutionalists, 
like Harold Koh, have decried the modern, pragmatic changes in U.S. foreign 
relations law, particularly the move to executive branch supremacy, as 
departures from the original foreign affairs Constitution, and in tension with 
bedrock constitutional principles.110  Other progressives have taken other 
approaches to cast the twentieth century transformations into doubt: Sarah 
Cleveland, for instance, has traced their roots to odious nativist nineteenth 
century doctrines and policies dealing with marginalized groups like Native 
Americans and immigrants.111  I hope to have shown here that the modern 
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developments do have more weighty and mainstream antecedents than 
progressives believe in the Civil War interpretations set forth in the Prize 
Cases, but at the same time that these antecedents do not go as far as 
conservatives would like in justifying executive unilateralism and a disregard 
of international law. 
Let me be clear about the ambiguity of what exactly the history of U.S. 
foreign relations law in the Civil War reveals.  It does not, for instance, show 
unqualified acceptance of the shibboleth of an all-powerful, unencumbered 
Executive in foreign affairs even in times of war.  Nor is it clear that judicial 
deference to the Executive in its interpretations of international law and other 
foreign relations matters, notwithstanding their invocation, is of central 
importance in the Prize Cases; it is important to grasp the context and 
ramifications of such deference.  And, as a general matter, it is surely relevant 
that these interpretations were rendered under wartime conditions, when the 
Court has historically seemed a timid institution, and were forgotten almost as 
soon as they were rendered. 
If the historical example of the Civil War interpretations of the foreign 
affairs Constitution yields anything of value to future generations, it may be 
the unanimous emphasis placed by all the major players in the Executive and 
Judicial Branches on contemporaneous international law as a legitimate 
referent and gap-filler in light of perceived ambiguity in the American 
constitutional document on the very important legal questions at issue.  What is 
also clear is that, by contrast to the modern period, the state-based, war-
permissive regime of international law at the time generally favored the 
Executive’s interpretations which shaded to maximal use of armed force and 
war prosecution.  Put another way, international law seemed to allow the 
President to do what U.S. constitutional law would not allow; this is different 
from now, where international law is perceived as limiting what the President 
might lawfully do in wartime under U.S. law alone.  The underlying point may 
be that those constitutionalists, generally of a progressive, peace-favoring ilk, 
who support the role of international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation 
should be prepared to take the bitter with the sweet and accept the possibility 
that international law might support not only limitations on presidential war 
powers but also expansions of it. 
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